You mean this answer? Fine. I'll play that game:
Jophiel wrote:
He's saying that racial classification, if it is to be upheld, must have a permissible state objective in order for it to be legal. The entire paragraph is about when it's legal to classify people racially and has nothing directly to do with the "purpose" of marriage.
Can we agree that the entire argument here is that gender combination of a couple should be treated the same as racial combinations in terms of the 14th amendment protections? Thus, the same test which would allow discrimination on the basis of race would apply to the basis of sexual orientation, right?
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The entire paragraph wrote:
There can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race. The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different races. Over the years, this Court has consistently repudiated "distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry" as being "odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v. United States (1944), and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate. Indeed, two members of this Court have already stated that they "cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the color of a person's skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense."
Yeah, I know you found a little catch phrase in there with "state objective" and thought you really had a zinger but reading the paragraph with any measure of comprehension kind of deflates your balloon. The notion of a "state objective" for marriage is not even explored (no doubt because "
It's just obvious!!", right?)
The state objective for limiting marriage to same race couples is examined though. Thus, the state objective for limiting marriage to opposite sex couples must be examined as well. Given that this is a much older and more universally held aspect of marriage, it's impossible to do that without examining the whole objective of marriage as defined by the state.
Were you seriously basing your argument over such a hair splitting detail? If your argument were correct, then it would be unconstitutional to ban polygamy. Clearly, you're missing something when broadly declaring marriage as a "fundamental right" which cannot be infringed. You're missing the context of what marriage is in relationship to what laws define it. In the case of racial discrimination, the court could find no state objective other than sheer discrimination to restrict marriage on the basis of race.
That cannot be said of restrictions of marriage on the basis of sexual combination of the couple in question. You seem to have glossed over the part which said "The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different races". The court didn't have to examine the issue of marriage further in order to see that the discrimination was purely arbitrary. They found no relevant fundamental difference between a man and woman of the same race marrying and a man and a woman of different races marrying.
This is doubly relevant when we already had this conversation before and I showed you how the determination of marriage as a "fundamental right" largely rested on previous rulings having to do with child rearing and a broad right to procreate with the person you choose. It's unlikely that the court will magically miss this.
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The paragraph is roughly equal to the already agreed upon statement that the right to marry should not be infringed upon unless there was some major overriding reason to do so (i.e. "state objective" for racial discrimination). Again, the question becomes whether or not there's a good enough reason to deny homosexuals protection under the Equal Protection Clause to deny them their fundamental right to marry.
Because the state objective for marriage statutes is to encourage couples who might procreate to first bind themselves into a state managed marriage contract. The discrimination fills that state objective, and the objective is not itself discriminatory. Thus, it passes the test.
That there's an extra layer of thought involved maybe confuses you, but not me.