zepoodle wrote:
Well, okay. You can modify or change the meaning of a word, but doing so without consideration for the word's origin causes problems. If we hear Osama calling the Americans crusaders, that colours our image of the historical Crusades, in the same way that our knowledge of the historical Crusades would colour our view of the Americans if we believed what Osama was saying.
They're complex terms. Using them hamfistedly just creates confusion between what you're trying to say and the actual historical events you're referring to when you use the word.
Especially when you consider ALL of the crusades, like the
Children's Crusade, for example.
That one didn't end so well.
Anyhoo, you know what I meant Zep.
Back on topic, I think this was Rumsfeld's way of glossing over some of the negatives in those reports while kissing his bosses *** at the same time. But the stuff in the article about Katrina may **** me off even more than the religious crap.
Article wrote:
...when I asked a top White House official how he would characterize Rumsfeld’s assistance in the response to Hurricane Katrina, I found out why. “It was commonly known in the West Wing that there was a battle with Rumsfeld regarding this,†said the official. “I can’t imagine another defense secretary throwing up the kinds of obstacles he did.â€
Though various military bases had been mobilized into a state of alert well before the advance team’s tour, Rumsfeld’s aversion to using active-duty troops was evident: “There’s no doubt in my mind,†says one of Bush’s close advisers today, “that Rumsfeld didn’t like the concept.â€
Three days after landfall, word of disorder in New Orleans had reached a fever pitch. According to sources familiar with the conversation, DHS secretary Michael Chertoff called Rumsfeld that morning and said, “You’re going to need several thousand troops.â€
“Well, I disagree,†said the SecDef. “And I’m going to tell the president we don’t need any more than the National Guard.â€
The problem was that the Guard deployment (which would eventually reach 15,000 troops) had not arrived—at least not in sufficient numbers, and not where it needed to be. And though much of the chaos was being overstated by the media, the very suggestion of a state of anarchy was enough to dissuade other relief workers from entering the city. Having only recently come to grips with the roiling disaster, Bush convened a meeting in the Situation Room on Friday morning. According to several who were present, the president was agitated. Turning to the man seated at his immediate left, Bush barked, “Rumsfeld, what the hell is going on there? Are you watching what’s on television? Is that the United States of America or some Third World nation I’m watching? What the hell are you doing?â€
Rumsfeld replied by trotting out the ongoing National Guard deployments and suggesting that sending active-duty troops would create “unity of command†issues. Visibly impatient, Bush turned away from Rumsfeld and began to direct his inquiries at Lieutenant General Honoré on the video screen. “From then on, it was a Bush-Honoré dialogue,†remembers another participant. “The president cut Rumsfeld to pieces. I just wish it had happened earlier in the week.â€
But still the troops hadn’t arrived. And by Saturday morning, says Honoré, “we had dispersed all of these people across Louisiana. So we needed more troops to go to distribution centers, feed people, and maintain traffic.†That morning Bush convened yet another meeting in the Situation Room. Chertoff was emphatic. “Mr. President,†he said, “if we’re not going to begin to get these troops, we’re not going to be able to get the job done.â€
Rumsfeld could see the writing on the wall and had come prepared with a deployment plan in hand. Still, he did not volunteer it. Only when Bush ordered, “Don, do it,†did he acquiesce and send in the troops—a full five days after landfall.
Today, when I presented this account to Rumsfeld’s then homeland-affairs assistant, Paul McHale, he denied that Rumsfeld’s actions resulted in any delay: “This was by far the largest, fastest deployment of forces probably for any purposes in the history of the United States.†McHale argues that Rumsfeld’s caution was due to his conviction that Bush could not send in the military as de facto law-enforcement officers under the Insurrection Act. But as one of the top lawyers involved in such scenarios for Katrina would say, “That in my mind was just a stall tactic so as not to get the active-duty military engaged. All you needed to do was use them for logistics.â€
Ultimately, Rumsfeld’s obfuscations about National Guard rotations, unity-of-command challenges, and the Insurrection Act did not serve his commander in chief, says one senior official intimately involved with the whole saga: “There’s a difference between saying to the president of the United States, ‘I understand, and let me solve it,’ and making the president figure out the right question to ask.â€
“What it’s about,†says this official, “is recognizing that in an emergency, the appearance of control has real operational significance. If people are panicked, everything becomes harder. If we had put those troops in on Thursday, the narrative of Katrina would be a very different one.â€
What a
fucking as
shole.