Perhaps a pair of tits or ovaries, maybe. Preventing our government the ability to keep an eye on foreigners via wiretaps is just stupid. We should actually go further and ankle bracelet anyone not a US citizen just to keep tabs on the sneaky sumbitches.
------------------------------------------------------
you dont understand at all.
they have always had the authority to wire tap anyone they want to wire tap. they dont even have to get a warrant before hand. all they had to do was do the deed, and get a warrant within 48 hours AFTER the tap.
thats not good enough for this addministraition. they want the authority to wire tap, both foreign and domestic without EVER getting a warrent. that is what the fight is about. and they are selling it to the more ignorant of you sheep by telling you your safety is at issue if they cant do it without oversight.
even if, and i dont, you trusted this addministraition to "do the right thing" with that type of blanket authority without any oversight, eventually, someone would abuse that authority, just like Nixon did, and use that power for something other than defending this country.
that is why our forefathers designed 3 equal and independant levels of government. to make sure no one branch could trample on the rights of the people without recourse. what this addministraition is trying to shove down your throats with a lump of fear is exactly what the constitution was written to prevent. its tyrany in its purest form. blanket absolute authority without recoarse. a dictatorship.
its unconstitutional. it undermines the very foundation of democracy and places absolute power in the hands of a small group of men without any recorse if they breach that trust.
its the morale majority working HARD to force you to live your life as THEY intended.
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- Have the Dems Finally Grown a Pair?
Have the Dems Finally Grown a Pair?Follow
shadowrelm wrote:
they have always had the authority to wire tap anyone they want to wire tap. they dont even have to get a warrant before hand. all they had to do was do the deed, and get a warrant within 48 hours AFTER the tap.
Slight nitpick, but it's 72 hours.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_warrantless_surveillance_controversy#FISA
The One and Only BrownDuck wrote:
The way to fix the laws is not to pass a law allowing permanent circumvention of the laws already in place.
What "permanent circumvention" are you talking about? Have you read FISA? Have you read the "Protect America Act" (the proposed additions to FISA)?
Despite popular opinion, the proposed changes are designed to codify what the government can and can't do in terms of electronic surveillance with regard to newer technology like the internet (something that didn't exist in 1978 when FISA was written). It's not about circumventing. It's about passing laws that relate to new technology. Congress is free to make those new laws as restrictive or non-restrictive on government as they wish.
The Dems are simply afraid to step into the issue. They've allowed Bush to get mauled on it over the last 6 years because he had to make the choices regarding foreign surveillance. They were more then happy to sit on the sidelines and let him make the choices and let people bash him for it. Now, when they're in a position to define the law so that everyone knows what's legal, they're balking.
It's not about protecting freedom. If that were the case, they'd pass a law that protected freedoms. This is purely about avoiding responsibility.
Quote:
If Bush and co. want to propose fixes to existing laws that account for technology updates and the modern terrorist threat, I'm sure that would be much more widely accepted than merely trying to permanently extend a law granting them the ability to execute the law without judicial oversight.
Um... That's exactly what happened. Bush and Co asked Congress to come up with new FISA regulations to cover new technology. Congress did that in the form of the "Protect America Act". However, that act had a 180 day sunset clause on it. Congress was supposed to use that 6 months to see how the law worked, make corrections if needed, and then pass a new law (hopefully a permanent one, but another temporary one to test out the new changes is fine).
Congress failed to follow up on its end of the bargain, putting the executive branch of the government once again in the situation of having to make policy and set guidelines for their intelligence agencies with no idea what the law is supposed to be.
It's not "growing a pair". It's failing to do what they were elected to do. Even (and especially) if you're one of those liberals who voted Dem out of the desire to see them set limits on the presidency with regard to the war on terror, you should be outraged that they've failed to do this. Not passing any sort of extension or updates to FISA puts us back to where we were before. You know. Exactly the kind of stuff all those liberals voted Dems into office to change...
The reality is that Bush essentially threw a challenge to the Dem congress that if they thought he was overstepping the spirit of FISA, they should write additions to ensure that the law was clear with regard to newer technology. By not coming up with one, the Dems have effectively blinked on this issue.
That's not "growing a pair". It's "backing down from a challenge". They made a huge deal about Bush's supposed violations of FISA, yet when challenged to write a law that they think represents the correct powers that should be available to the government (and what limits should apply), they failed to do do. That's called failure, not success. Why anyone would think this was a victory for Dems is beyond me...
King Nobby wrote:
More words please
shadowrelm wrote:
thats not good enough for this addministraition. they want the authority to wire tap, both foreign and domestic without EVER getting a warrent.
No. That's not the issue at all. What's "not good enough for this administration" is a situation where they're trying to conduct electronic surveillance on a known foreign person or group, and they're being bogged down in red tape because the email server used by that group happens to be served out of a location on US soil. So even though every endpoint of the communication is "foreign" and by the spirit of FISA should not require any sort of warrant, they're getting bashed on a technicality that simply didn't exist when the FISA definitions were written.
Seriously. It would help the issue tremendously if more people actually read the laws in question rather then just repeat rhetoric they've heard...
King Nobby wrote:
More words please
Yes Gbaji Bush was forced into this position by Cong- wait a moment here... Oh, I have received word that he was going to VETO THE DAMN THING unless the telecomm companies were given immunity. So then a crafty congressman said "Mkay you can have some cake, but you can't eat it." And he paper clipped a thing on it saying that waterboarding is illegal. Bush being a decider and not wanting to compromise with congress, got himself in a damned if I do damed if I don't situation. All because he loves him some telecomm companies. Now it has expired and Bush is saying that if they don't redraft it we will all die horrible painful deaths.
I say that if all that the bill included was updated stuff regarding the internet then it should be passed, but anything further would have been ridiculous.
I say that if all that the bill included was updated stuff regarding the internet then it should be passed, but anything further would have been ridiculous.
manwithplanx wrote:
Yes Gbaji Bush was forced into this position by Cong- wait a moment here... Oh, I have received word that he was going to VETO THE DAMN THING unless the telecomm companies were given immunity.
Yes. You're correct. A law that gives the government the power to force telecomm companies to hand over their records (under court order with contempt charges waiting for non-compliance), but then does not protect them from lawsuits as a result of obeying the governments demand is a wonderful idea...
See how this has nothing to do with protecting rights? If they wanted to protect the rights of the citizens and believed that the government should not be able to subpoena phone and internet records, they should have written that into the law, right? They didn't. Instead, they left companies that complied with the government open to lawsuit.
Feel free to speculate on why they'd do that. I'm betting at no point does "protecting citizen's rights to privacy" enter the equation.
Quote:
So then a crafty congressman said "Mkay you can have some cake, but you can't eat it." And he paper clipped a thing on it saying that waterboarding is illegal.
Waterboarding has absolutely nothing to do with this law. Period. Stop making stuff up. Go research the issue instead. You might just learn something.
Quote:
Bush being a decider and not wanting to compromise with congress, got himself in a damned if I do damed if I don't situation. All because he loves him some telecomm companies. Now it has expired and Bush is saying that if they don't redraft it we will all die horrible painful deaths.
You really don't know how congress works, do you? When a party in congress really doesn't want a law passed, the deliberately put a "poison pill" into the law. Something that they know is so untenable and unworkable that the law can't possibly pass muster. Then they blame the other side for refusing to pass it.
That's what the whole "protection for telecomms is about". Nothing more. How does not protecting telecomms from lawsuit if they comply with the government's court order protect your rights?
Answer: It doesn't. But it does provide a nice bit of smokescreen (and plays on the "Conservatives just want to protect evil big business" angle)...
Quote:
I say that if all that the bill included was updated stuff regarding the internet then it should be passed, but anything further would have been ridiculous.
It did. But part of that was the ability of the government to subpoena records. Remember, prior to the introduction of digital communications, records of who called whom, or sent email to whom, or logged on to who's website wasn't available (and the last ones didn't exist anyway). However, the ability to obtain those records falls well within the powers of the government in this context, has been used by police organizations (also without requiring a warrant) for decades, and can provide an invaluable tool for tracking terrorist groups.
If they opposed that, they should have fought to remove it. Not simply fought to prevent any sort of immunity for the companies who's data they obtain. That smacks of oppressive government, doesn't it? Give the government power to do something that you can't prevent, and which then opens you up to lawsuit.
Yup. Great idea...
King Nobby wrote:
More words please
Instead of Gbaji rhetoric, let's look at the bill in question, shall we?
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s110-1927
First change to FISA is defined as:
OK, so when dealing with what we believe to be foreign persons, our existing definition of electronic surveillance is out the window. No surveillance to be conducted on those persons believed to be foreign can be classified as electronic surveillance under the code enacted by FISA.
What does that mean in terms of this act?
Well... the next ammendment is:
Mind you, the "for periods of up to one year" is the clause that would be permanently extended by the currently proposed revision. So basically, the Director of National Intelligence and the AG can directly authorize the surveillance of persons believed to be foreign, so long as this surveillance is not considered "electronic surveillance". But as we just read, by virtue of the suspect being foreign, the definition of electronic surveillance is not applicable. Note: There is no redefinition of electronic surveillance in the PAA of 2007, which leaves us with the conclusion that any the director of national intelligence and the AG can directly authorize any foreign intelligence gathering, period.
The bill goes on to say:
So, any authorization made in the previously quoted ammendment is not required to identify pretty much anything about where the intelligence is directed. For example, they could claim to be conducting surveillance on foreign nationals, and tap all communications at the hotel they are staying at, or, taken literally, anywhere else, without defining these targets.
To be fair, it does say:
So any authorization made must be transmitted to the court defined in section 103(a), but this authorization must remain sealed (under lock and key, basically) unless the directive to open it is to determine the legality of it. So unless you have a panel of judges willing to question the legality of any and all surveillance authorizations, this has little to no effect. Let's not forget that such surveillance is top secret, and therefore, all but unknown to any who might be willing to challenge it (save for the judges, who know nothing about the surveillance until they decide to question the legality of it). Kind of a catch 22.
Further more, the bill says:
So the agency involved in this surveillance can walk into an AT&T tier 1 data center and demand access to their communications systems, all while prohibiting the AT&T parties involved from saying anything. Note: AT&T can be any company you like that might potentially be an enabler for such surveillance.
Also:
So if AT&T refuses, the agencies have the right to get obtain a compliance order from the previously established court.
I will give you this much: At this point, the court must review the previous surveillance authorization to determine whether it should be considered lawful. However, it is at this point, and only this point, that anyone outside of the top secret circle jerk of high-ranking officials has the potential to inject any such challenge to the authorization. No warrant or judicial oversight is required up front, and pending some major security leak or internal bickering, it is not likely that the majority of these authorizations would be reviewed (we all know how busy our representatives are, right?)
Also worth mentioning:
This is the so-called third-party immunity clause.
In the end, Gbaji, yes, this act gives the government, (more specifically, the attorney general and the director of national intelligence) too much power, especially under the context of being considered for a permanent extension.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s110-1927
First change to FISA is defined as:
Quote:
Nothing in the definition of electronic surveillance under section 101(f) shall be construed to encompass surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States.
OK, so when dealing with what we believe to be foreign persons, our existing definition of electronic surveillance is out the window. No surveillance to be conducted on those persons believed to be foreign can be classified as electronic surveillance under the code enacted by FISA.
What does that mean in terms of this act?
Well... the next ammendment is:
Quote:
Sec. 105B. (a) Notwithstanding any other law, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General, may for periods of up to one year authorize the acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States if the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General determine, based on the information provided to them, that--
...
(2) the acquisition does not constitute electronic surveillance;
...
...
(2) the acquisition does not constitute electronic surveillance;
...
Mind you, the "for periods of up to one year" is the clause that would be permanently extended by the currently proposed revision. So basically, the Director of National Intelligence and the AG can directly authorize the surveillance of persons believed to be foreign, so long as this surveillance is not considered "electronic surveillance". But as we just read, by virtue of the suspect being foreign, the definition of electronic surveillance is not applicable. Note: There is no redefinition of electronic surveillance in the PAA of 2007, which leaves us with the conclusion that any the director of national intelligence and the AG can directly authorize any foreign intelligence gathering, period.
The bill goes on to say:
Quote:
A certification under subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific facilities, places, premises, or property at which the acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be directed.
So, any authorization made in the previously quoted ammendment is not required to identify pretty much anything about where the intelligence is directed. For example, they could claim to be conducting surveillance on foreign nationals, and tap all communications at the hotel they are staying at, or, taken literally, anywhere else, without defining these targets.
To be fair, it does say:
Quote:
(c) The Attorney General shall transmit as soon as practicable under seal to the court established under section 103(a) a copy of a certification made under subsection (a). Such certification shall be maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice of the United States and the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, and shall remain sealed unless the certification is necessary to determine the legality of the acquisition under section 105B.
So any authorization made must be transmitted to the court defined in section 103(a), but this authorization must remain sealed (under lock and key, basically) unless the directive to open it is to determine the legality of it. So unless you have a panel of judges willing to question the legality of any and all surveillance authorizations, this has little to no effect. Let's not forget that such surveillance is top secret, and therefore, all but unknown to any who might be willing to challenge it (save for the judges, who know nothing about the surveillance until they decide to question the legality of it). Kind of a catch 22.
Further more, the bill says:
Quote:
With respect to an authorization of an acquisition under section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and Attorney General may direct a person to--
(1) immediately provide the Government with all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition in such a manner as will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such person is providing to the target; and
(2) maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished that such person wishes to maintain.
(1) immediately provide the Government with all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition in such a manner as will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such person is providing to the target; and
(2) maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished that such person wishes to maintain.
So the agency involved in this surveillance can walk into an AT&T tier 1 data center and demand access to their communications systems, all while prohibiting the AT&T parties involved from saying anything. Note: AT&T can be any company you like that might potentially be an enabler for such surveillance.
Also:
Quote:
In the case of a failure to comply with a directive issued pursuant to subsection (e), the Attorney General may invoke the aid of the court established under section 103(a) to compel compliance with the directive. The court shall issue an order requiring the person to comply with the directive if it finds that the directive was issued in accordance with subsection (e) and is otherwise lawful. Failure to obey an order of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of court. Any process under this section may be served in any judicial district in which the person may be found.
...
A judge considering a petition to modify or set aside a directive may grant such petition only if the judge finds that such directive does not meet the requirements of this section or is otherwise unlawful. If the judge does not modify or set aside the directive, the judge shall immediately affirm such directive, and order the recipient to comply with such directive.
...
A judge considering a petition to modify or set aside a directive may grant such petition only if the judge finds that such directive does not meet the requirements of this section or is otherwise unlawful. If the judge does not modify or set aside the directive, the judge shall immediately affirm such directive, and order the recipient to comply with such directive.
So if AT&T refuses, the agencies have the right to get obtain a compliance order from the previously established court.
I will give you this much: At this point, the court must review the previous surveillance authorization to determine whether it should be considered lawful. However, it is at this point, and only this point, that anyone outside of the top secret circle jerk of high-ranking officials has the potential to inject any such challenge to the authorization. No warrant or judicial oversight is required up front, and pending some major security leak or internal bickering, it is not likely that the majority of these authorizations would be reviewed (we all know how busy our representatives are, right?)
Also worth mentioning:
Quote:
Notwithstanding any other law, no cause of action shall lie in any court against any person for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with a directive under this section.
This is the so-called third-party immunity clause.
In the end, Gbaji, yes, this act gives the government, (more specifically, the attorney general and the director of national intelligence) too much power, especially under the context of being considered for a permanent extension.
The One and Only BrownDuck wrote:
Instead of Gbaji rhetoric, let's look at the bill in question, shall we?
Lol. I've read the full text of the law, and of FISA. That's the difference I suspect, and based on how badly you've misinterpreted the meaning of the law, I think my suspicions are confirmed.
Quote:
Quote:
Nothing in the definition of electronic surveillance under section 101(f) shall be construed to encompass surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States.
OK, so when dealing with what we believe to be foreign persons, our existing definition of electronic surveillance is out the window. No surveillance to be conducted on those persons believed to be foreign can be classified as electronic surveillance under the code enacted by FISA.
No no no! You haven't read FISA have you? FISA uses four criteria to define something as "electronic surveillance". That definition is used in this context specifically to mean "surveillance requiring FISA court approval. In otherwords, if you meet those conditions you must have a FISA court warrant. If you don't meet those conditions you don't.
What you also have to know is that the four conditions are all aimed at preventing "domestic" use of federal surveillance (without a warrant). Basically, the goal is to allow the government to spy on people that are not on US soil without any restrictions. The conditions are defined in such a way as to ensure that domestic spying requires a FISA court warrant.
What this is saying is that if the person who is the target of the proposed surveillance is clearly not on US soil, then even if the surveillance meets one of the other criteria, it still does not require a warrant. If you'd read FISA you'd understand this, because some of the criteria will say things like: "Both ends of the communication are on US soil", or "if the tapping equipment is on US soil". Which, in the days of analog phones was pretty easy to define. In todays world where it's hard to say "where" a website is legally, or where the "endpoint" of an email is (does that mean the computer, or the server that's hosting it?), it's much more complex.
The attempt here is to clarify that if we know that the guy we're tapping is not himself on US soil, we don't have to worry about the other restrictions.
If you'd read FISA, you'd know this since it's specifically modifying that law.
Quote:
Well... the next ammendment is:
Mind you, the "for periods of up to one year" is the clause that would be permanently extended by the currently proposed revision. So basically, the Director of National Intelligence and the AG can directly authorize the surveillance of persons believed to be foreign, so long as this surveillance is not considered "electronic surveillance". But as we just read, by virtue of the suspect being foreign, the definition of electronic surveillance is not applicable. Note: There is no redefinition of electronic surveillance in the PAA of 2007, which leaves us with the conclusion that any the director of national intelligence and the AG can directly authorize any foreign intelligence gathering, period.
Quote:
Sec. 105B. (a) Notwithstanding any other law, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General, may for periods of up to one year authorize the acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States if the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General determine, based on the information provided to them, that--
...
(2) the acquisition does not constitute electronic surveillance;
...
...
(2) the acquisition does not constitute electronic surveillance;
...
Mind you, the "for periods of up to one year" is the clause that would be permanently extended by the currently proposed revision. So basically, the Director of National Intelligence and the AG can directly authorize the surveillance of persons believed to be foreign, so long as this surveillance is not considered "electronic surveillance". But as we just read, by virtue of the suspect being foreign, the definition of electronic surveillance is not applicable. Note: There is no redefinition of electronic surveillance in the PAA of 2007, which leaves us with the conclusion that any the director of national intelligence and the AG can directly authorize any foreign intelligence gathering, period.
First off. No. The "for periods of up to one year" isn't extended. The law itself is. This period isn't affected at all.
And you're totally misreading the meaning here. First off, the waiver for meeting the criteria of "electronic surveillance" in the first part is contingent on the target not being on US soil. Just being a foreigner does not change anything here. Secondly, had you read what was meant by "electronic surveillance", they're referencing a list of criteria that currently require FISA court approval (but per the earlier paragraph will not if the person is known to be on foreign soil).
What this is saying, is that as long as the conditions of the surveillance do not meet those under the existing FISA (which require warrants if met), then they can conduct this surveillance for up to 1 year. So, as long as the tapped conversations have at least one endpoint outside the US, or the tapping equipment itself is *not* on US soil, and the intent of the tap is not to listen to a US persons phone conversations by tapping foreign numbers (option number three), and one more incredibly esoteric requirement involving ham radio conversations across national boundaries that even I don't fully understand, then the surveillance can be maintained for up to 1 year.
That doesn't reduce your freedom one bit. In fact, that's already present in the existing FISA, although I think this does allow for a longer time period. That's it. There's no reduction of criteria for this, just a lengthening of the time frame.
Quote:
The bill goes on to say:
So, any authorization made in the previously quoted ammendment is not required to identify pretty much anything about where the intelligence is directed. For example, they could claim to be conducting surveillance on foreign nationals, and tap all communications at the hotel they are staying at, or, taken literally, anywhere else, without defining these targets.
Quote:
A certification under subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific facilities, places, premises, or property at which the acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be directed.
So, any authorization made in the previously quoted ammendment is not required to identify pretty much anything about where the intelligence is directed. For example, they could claim to be conducting surveillance on foreign nationals, and tap all communications at the hotel they are staying at, or, taken literally, anywhere else, without defining these targets.
Yup. But the surveillance can't meet those criteria mentioned earlier.
See. If you read FISA, this all makes sense. Basically, this is saying that as long as at least one end of any tapped communication is outside the US, and the tapping equipment is outside the US (and the other two more esoteric requirements), they don't have to specify every single facility or whatever that's going to be tapped.
There are a lot of reasons for this, btw. I don't really feel like giving you a long explanation. Suffice it to say that in the case where the NSA doesn't need FISA court approval for a wiretap, it shouldn't have to get separate approval from the AG for every tap it does. The AG should be able to say "Tap that group of bad guys", and as long as all their taps meet the criteria defined in FISA, they don't have to fill out paperwork on each and every single one. In a day and age of disposable cell phones, this is kinda important...
Quote:
To be fair, it does say:
Quote:
(c) The Attorney General shall transmit as soon as practicable under seal to the court established under section 103(a) a copy of a certification made under subsection (a). Such certification shall be maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice of the United States and the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, and shall remain sealed unless the certification is necessary to determine the legality of the acquisition under section 105B.
Yup. Checks and balances. The objective is to give our intelligence guys the tools they need to be able to track down "bad guys" who are using modern communication equipment, without hampering them with regulations written back in the days when people couldn't change their methods of communication faster then you could get the paperwork signed.
Quote:
So the agency involved in this surveillance can walk into an AT&T tier 1 data center and demand access to their communications systems, all while prohibiting the AT&T parties involved from saying anything. Note: AT&T can be any company you like that might potentially be an enabler for such surveillance.
Let's be clear here. This section is specific to "records". Not tapping. Also, this section is something that is already "legal". Part of the license you sign when you legally become a telecomm provider is that you must keep records of all data transfers you manage and provide that data to any law enforcement agency that requests them.
This is a power that the government already has. Has had for 20 years or so. Ever since phone companies started using computer controlled digital switches (and therefore *could* store records of connections made), this has been required of them. Internet providers have always fallen under these restrictions as well (since the internet came along *after* that time).
It's not a new and alarming power, no matter how much this is implied. They can and have been doing this all along. The only real difference is the requirement in this case for secrecy. Normally, if the police subpoena some records, the company can tell anyone it wants that this has happened. Obviously, that's not doable if this is a legitimate national security search, right? The other key component in this law is the protection of said companies from lawsuits for complying with the government.
Um... Which is a response to a tactic being used by the privacy folks to attack companies that comply with the law. Go figure! Has nothing to do with privacy at all. Heck. The records aren't private. No matter what some idiots will try to say, while your "papers" are private (ie: content of messages you send), the fact that you sent them and where they went isn't. The government can't open your mail, but it's always been able to read the address(es) if it wants. This is no different. You do not have any expectation of privacy with regard to where you send email to, or what websites you log into. No more then you have an expectation of privacy with regard to what stores you visit in the mall. Sure. I can't look inside you bag without a warrant, but I can record the fact that you entered a given store if I want.
Records of communications are not protected property. You don't own them. They aren't private. This does not give the government any power it didn't have before with regard to obtaining this information. All it does is prevent companies from potentially warning the subject that his records have been requested, and protect said companies from silly lawsuits by privacy advocates playing off the severe lack of knowledge in this area.
Quote:
So if AT&T refuses, the agencies have the right to get obtain a compliance order from the previously established court.
Yup. Just as a police investigator can do the same. This isn't a new power. It's basically a duplicate of existing domestic police investigation laws re-written in the context of intelligence agency use.
Quote:
In the end, Gbaji, yes, this act gives the government, (more specifically, the attorney general and the director of national intelligence) too much power, especially under the context of being considered for a permanent extension.
You think that because you don't know what the existing FISA law says, and seem unfamiliar with normal police powers with regard to subpoenaing of records.
If you knew more about those two things, you'd realize that there are virtually zero additional powers granted here. All it does is codify things that FISA already allows while clarifying how they fit in with newer technology.
Seriously. Read FISA. I think you're progressing from an amazingly incorrect assumption about what that law does.
King Nobby wrote:
More words please
WARNING: some of the quotes in this article might not work right. It's alla's fault for not supporting enough quote blocks per post, not mine. 
Yes I know these conditions, I read them. They are here for others to reference. See section (f).
Big fucking DUH, Gbaji. The problem is that the definition of non-domestic persons is purposely vague, and the rights granted by the PAA do not exclude domestic surveillance in connection with foreign suspects. Think about it.
"reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States." does not mean "clearly not on US soil", and the entire argument still doesn't exclude domestic citizens from such surveillance in connection with these supposed foreign bodies.
First, the statement you keep referencing is an "any of the above", not "all of the above" statement. And the specific statement you mention now is listed below:
Second, exactly what point are you making here? Because it sounds like you're trying to say that if both parties are on US soil, then the PAA does not give the government authority to conduct surveillance on them, which is false. The very dismissal of the definition of "electronic surveillance" destroys any reference to the section previously referenced in the original FISA act, so long as the suspect can be reasonably believed to be foreign. This is my original point, and not something you have directly denied, although your misdirection attempt was quite fluid.
Again,
is not clear enough. You try to make it sound like they have to have some kind of proof the person is on foreign soil, but they do not. In addition, this amendment leaves open the possibility for surveillance of those believed to be engaged in communications with these "supposed" foreign suspects, whether or not this belief can be proven.
I have read the majority of this document where referenced by the PAA of 2007. I believe this to be the actual code of the FISA act. So yes, I've done my reading. You can stop using that as a crutch now.
Mmmkay, exactly what part of the law is extended then? Please provide documentation to this effect. You're directly dismissing what public information is currently available, so maybe you have some inside track to the documentation currently being considered by our congressional representatives. Please, if you're going to make such a statement, provide references.
Fucking hell. Are you really this dense? From this point on I'm just going to rehash the quote:
Didn't we JUST FUcking do this? See reference. I'm starting to wonder if people realize that 80% of the length of your posts can be attributed to discussing the same few lines of rhetoric over and over.
I'm willing to concede here, with the exception that again, proof of location is not required, only the reasonable expectation that the person being monitored is located outside of the US. While I do understand the difficulty in drafting a law that is more specific due to electronic boundaries that are sometimes unidentifiable until it is too late, I do think that the current wording of the bill remains too open to interpretation, and no legal recourse is offered for when it is misinterpreted. The bill basically grants immunity for misuse of the rights granted therein.
(continued in next post...)
Edited, Feb 16th 2008 12:01am by BrownDuck
gbaji wrote:
No no no! You haven't read FISA have you? FISA uses four criteria to define something as "electronic surveillance". That definition is used in this context specifically to mean "surveillance requiring FISA court approval. In otherwords, if you meet those conditions you must have a FISA court warrant. If you don't meet those conditions you don't.
Yes I know these conditions, I read them. They are here for others to reference. See section (f).
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What you also have to know is that the four conditions are all aimed at preventing "domestic" use of federal surveillance (without a warrant). Basically, the goal is to allow the government to spy on people that are not on US soil without any restrictions. The conditions are defined in such a way as to ensure that domestic spying requires a FISA court warrant.
Big fucking DUH, Gbaji. The problem is that the definition of non-domestic persons is purposely vague, and the rights granted by the PAA do not exclude domestic surveillance in connection with foreign suspects. Think about it.
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What this is saying is that if the person who is the target of the proposed surveillance is clearly not on US soil, then even if the surveillance meets one of the other criteria, it still does not require a warrant.
"reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States." does not mean "clearly not on US soil", and the entire argument still doesn't exclude domestic citizens from such surveillance in connection with these supposed foreign bodies.
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If you'd read FISA you'd understand this, because some of the criteria will say things like: "Both ends of the communication are on US soil", or "if the tapping equipment is on US soil". Which, in the days of analog phones was pretty easy to define. In todays world where it's hard to say "where" a website is legally, or where the "endpoint" of an email is (does that mean the computer, or the server that's hosting it?), it's much more complex.
First, the statement you keep referencing is an "any of the above", not "all of the above" statement. And the specific statement you mention now is listed below:
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the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the United States;
Second, exactly what point are you making here? Because it sounds like you're trying to say that if both parties are on US soil, then the PAA does not give the government authority to conduct surveillance on them, which is false. The very dismissal of the definition of "electronic surveillance" destroys any reference to the section previously referenced in the original FISA act, so long as the suspect can be reasonably believed to be foreign. This is my original point, and not something you have directly denied, although your misdirection attempt was quite fluid.
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The attempt here is to clarify that if we know that the guy we're tapping is not himself on US soil, we don't have to worry about the other restrictions.
Again,
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reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States.
is not clear enough. You try to make it sound like they have to have some kind of proof the person is on foreign soil, but they do not. In addition, this amendment leaves open the possibility for surveillance of those believed to be engaged in communications with these "supposed" foreign suspects, whether or not this belief can be proven.
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If you'd read FISA, you'd know this since it's specifically modifying that law.
I have read the majority of this document where referenced by the PAA of 2007. I believe this to be the actual code of the FISA act. So yes, I've done my reading. You can stop using that as a crutch now.
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First off. No. The "for periods of up to one year" isn't extended. The law itself is. This period isn't affected at all.
Mmmkay, exactly what part of the law is extended then? Please provide documentation to this effect. You're directly dismissing what public information is currently available, so maybe you have some inside track to the documentation currently being considered by our congressional representatives. Please, if you're going to make such a statement, provide references.
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And you're totally misreading the meaning here. First off, the waiver for meeting the criteria of "electronic surveillance" in the first part is contingent on the target not being on US soil.
Fucking hell. Are you really this dense? From this point on I'm just going to rehash the quote:
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person reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States.
gbaji wrote:
Just being a foreigner does not change anything here. Secondly, had you read what was meant by "electronic surveillance", they're referencing a list of criteria that currently require FISA court approval (but per the earlier paragraph will not if the person is known to be on foreign soil).
Didn't we JUST FUcking do this? See reference. I'm starting to wonder if people realize that 80% of the length of your posts can be attributed to discussing the same few lines of rhetoric over and over.
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What this is saying, is that as long as the conditions of the surveillance do not meet those under the existing FISA (which require warrants if met), then they can conduct this surveillance for up to 1 year. So, as long as the tapped conversations have at least one endpoint outside the US, or the tapping equipment itself is *not* on US soil, and the intent of the tap is not to listen to a US persons phone conversations by tapping foreign numbers (option number three), and one more incredibly esoteric requirement involving ham radio conversations across national boundaries that even I don't fully understand, then the surveillance can be maintained for up to 1 year.
I'm willing to concede here, with the exception that again, proof of location is not required, only the reasonable expectation that the person being monitored is located outside of the US. While I do understand the difficulty in drafting a law that is more specific due to electronic boundaries that are sometimes unidentifiable until it is too late, I do think that the current wording of the bill remains too open to interpretation, and no legal recourse is offered for when it is misinterpreted. The bill basically grants immunity for misuse of the rights granted therein.
(continued in next post...)
Edited, Feb 16th 2008 12:01am by BrownDuck
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That doesn't reduce your freedom one bit. In fact, that's already present in the existing FISA, although I think this does allow for a longer time period. That's it. There's no reduction of criteria for this, just a lengthening of the time frame.
Wrong. All I have to do is chat with someone on the internet who makes an external reference to the US (as in, a comment that might give them reason to believe the person is located outside of the US) that ends up on their radar, and I become a potential suspect, as do all conversations with said person, and perhaps more.
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The bill goes on to say:
So, any authorization made in the previously quoted ammendment is not required to identify pretty much anything about where the intelligence is directed. For example, they could claim to be conducting surveillance on foreign nationals, and tap all communications at the hotel they are staying at, or, taken literally, anywhere else, without defining these targets.
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A certification under subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific facilities, places, premises, or property at which the acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be directed.
So, any authorization made in the previously quoted ammendment is not required to identify pretty much anything about where the intelligence is directed. For example, they could claim to be conducting surveillance on foreign nationals, and tap all communications at the hotel they are staying at, or, taken literally, anywhere else, without defining these targets.
Yup. But the surveillance can't meet those criteria mentioned earlier.
Unless there is reasonable evidence to support the belief that one or more of the parties involved are located on foreign soil. Then those criteria are out the window, regardless of the remaining parties which might be law abiding U.S. citizens.
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See. If you read FISA, this all makes sense. Basically, this is saying that as long as at least one end of any tapped communication is outside the US, and the tapping equipment is outside the US (and the other two more esoteric requirements), they don't have to specify every single facility or whatever that's going to be tapped.
Again, this specifically allows them to include monitoring within the U.S. without any oversight. By virtue of not being required to declare a tangible target location for their surveillance, they have too much freedom in deciding where to stick their noses.
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There are a lot of reasons for this, btw. I don't really feel like giving you a long explanation.
No sir. Any argument you participate in with me requires adequate evidence to support your claims. I will do no less for you, and I expect full reciprocation, or I expect you to bow out of the argument until such time as you are willing to do so.
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Suffice it to say that in the case where the NSA doesn't need FISA court approval for a wiretap, it shouldn't have to get separate approval from the AG for every tap it does. The AG should be able to say "Tap that group of bad guys", and as long as all their taps meet the criteria defined in FISA, they don't have to fill out paperwork on each and every single one. In a day and age of disposable cell phones, this is kinda important...
I agree that they should be able to define a scope for surveillance, rather than a particular individual or land line. My beef is in the lack of accountability. If they're tracking a cell phone, they can absolutely document where the phone was at the time it was being monitored. They can also document how long it was monitored and for what purpose, and who is believed to have been using it at the time.
I'm not suggesting this isn't being done internally to the intelligence agency, nor am I suggesting that such information should be public knowledge. But in cases where such things actually go to criminal court, such documentation should absolutely be admissible if not required as evidence.
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To be fair, it does say:
Yup. Checks and balances. The objective is to give our intelligence guys the tools they need to be able to track down "bad guys" who are using modern communication equipment, without hampering them with regulations written back in the days when people couldn't change their methods of communication faster then you could get the paperwork signed.
Let's be clear here. This section is specific to "records". Not tapping.
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(c) The Attorney General shall transmit as soon as practicable under seal to the court established under section 103(a) a copy of a certification made under subsection (a). Such certification shall be maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice of the United States and the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, and shall remain sealed unless the certification is necessary to determine the legality of the acquisition under section 105B.
Yup. Checks and balances. The objective is to give our intelligence guys the tools they need to be able to track down "bad guys" who are using modern communication equipment, without hampering them with regulations written back in the days when people couldn't change their methods of communication faster then you could get the paperwork signed.
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So the agency involved in this surveillance can walk into an AT&T tier 1 data center and demand access to their communications systems, all while prohibiting the AT&T parties involved from saying anything. Note: AT&T can be any company you like that might potentially be an enabler for such surveillance.
Let's be clear here. This section is specific to "records". Not tapping.
Blatantly wrong.
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(e) With respect to an authorization of an acquisition under section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and Attorney General may direct a person to--
(1) immediately provide the Government with all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition in such a manner as will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such person is providing to the target; and
(2) maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished that such person wishes to maintain.
(1) immediately provide the Government with all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition in such a manner as will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such person is providing to the target; and
(2) maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished that such person wishes to maintain.
Acquisition is a reference to acquisition of information in general, not merely paper documents. It applies to wire tapping and other real-time surveillance as well.
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This is a power that the government already has. Has had for 20 years or so.
Yeah. With a warrant. Not exactly the same now, is it?
(continued in next post...)
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It's not a new and alarming power, no matter how much this is implied. They can and have been doing this all along. The only real difference is the requirement in this case for secrecy.
And the ability to directly bypass judicial oversight. Doesn't matter what you think of the law. As long as there is no upfront validation of any authorizations under this act, the potential exists for it to be abused to any extent imaginable.
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So if AT&T refuses, the agencies have the right to get obtain a compliance order from the previously established court.
Yup. Just as a police investigator can do the same. This isn't a new power. It's basically a duplicate of existing domestic police investigation laws re-written in the context of intelligence agency use.
Fair enough. My point was that it is entirely possible that someone is forced to comply with an act they believe to be unjust, with but one course of action to challenge said requirement. Given the nature of the surveillance and the broad scope of authorization this bill grants, I still believe judicial approval should be required BEFORE the third party is required to offer any informatin, not merely after the fact, if and only if the third party challenges the request.
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In the end, Gbaji, yes, this act gives the government, (more specifically, the attorney general and the director of national intelligence) too much power, especially under the context of being considered for a permanent extension.
You think that because you don't know what the existing FISA law says, and seem unfamiliar with normal police powers with regard to subpoenaing of records.
If you knew more about those two things, you'd realize that there are virtually zero additional powers granted here. All it does is codify things that FISA already allows while clarifying how they fit in with newer technology.
Bullsh*t. Time for you to re-read this post. At this point you're flat out denying my knowledge in an attempt to bolster your own argument. You can go inside to hide from the rain Gbaji, but yes, it still rains.
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Seriously. Read FISA. I think you're progressing from an amazingly incorrect assumption about what that law does.
I am progressing, as does anybody who reads things and is open to education. However, you're still vastly underestimating my knowledge on the matter for the simple sake of presenting you argument as otherwise indisputable fact; I think it's quite apparent this is not the case.
FINAL POINT:
Laws should be openly restrictive, not openly permissive. This law is openly permissive.
Edited, Feb 16th 2008 12:37am by BrownDuck
You know, all this fussin' and bickering could be avoided if we just set into law that all Muzzies must be chipped and monitored. Everybody else gets a pass.
Presto. Problem solved, everybody's happy except the people who have a hard-on to kill you anyway.
Totem
Presto. Problem solved, everybody's happy except the people who have a hard-on to kill you anyway.
Totem
It's so nice to learn that according to the All Knowing gbaji, The NSA building at Fort Meade is on foreign soil.
BTW if you are worried that the NSA may not have the power to listen into Foreign Nationals phone calls, maybe you should be more concern about Maryland's current power grid can't handle the NSA's electrical power needs. Currently the NSA spends a lot of time trying to decide what area's are to be under brownouts during peak hours. Without a major overhaul to upgrade both the transmission lines and electrical equipment at NSA, all the eavesdropping you worry about may have to wait.
Last paragraph is written in Elnese and therefore will make no sense unless you passed Elnese 101.
BTW if you are worried that the NSA may not have the power to listen into Foreign Nationals phone calls, maybe you should be more concern about Maryland's current power grid can't handle the NSA's electrical power needs. Currently the NSA spends a lot of time trying to decide what area's are to be under brownouts during peak hours. Without a major overhaul to upgrade both the transmission lines and electrical equipment at NSA, all the eavesdropping you worry about may have to wait.
Last paragraph is written in Elnese and therefore will make no sense unless you passed Elnese 101.
In the place of a Dark Lord you would have a Queen! Not dark but beautiful and terrible as the Morn! Treacherous as the Seas! Stronger than the foundations of the Earth! All shall love me and despair! -ElneClare
This Post is written in Elnese, If it was an actual Post, it would make sense.
This Post is written in Elnese, If it was an actual Post, it would make sense.
Despite popular opinion, the proposed changes are designed to codify what the government can and can't do in terms of electronic surveillance with regard to newer technology like the internet (something that didn't exist in 1978 when FISA was written). It's not about circumventing. It's about passing laws that relate to new technology. Congress is free to make those new laws as restrictive or non-restrictive on government as they wish.
The Dems are simply afraid to step into the issue. They've allowed Bush to get mauled on it over the last 6 years because he had to make the choices regarding foreign surveillance. They were more then happy to sit on the sidelines and let him make the choices and let people bash him for it. Now, when they're in a position to define the law so that everyone knows what's legal, they're balking.
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again, blind ignorance and party bias.
yes, the bill address issues that are currently not covered under current policy like internet and cell phones. but that is not what the dems are balking at. and those provisions do not warrent giving one branch of the government absolute authority without recoarse.
the dems are not afriad of the internet and cell phones. infact, they raise more money online than the repubs do.
they are afraid of handing authority without recoarse to one branch of government without recoarse, and in particular, to an addministraition that has already breached our trust in a significant manner that has cost the lives of many human beings.......already without any recoarse. they will all get a presidential pardon when they walk out of office when they should be standing trial for war crimes and treason.
why did we go to Iraq?
turned out to not be true.
hundreds of thousands of human beings died, who will be held accountable?
no one.
the moral majority working hard for......someone.
The Dems are simply afraid to step into the issue. They've allowed Bush to get mauled on it over the last 6 years because he had to make the choices regarding foreign surveillance. They were more then happy to sit on the sidelines and let him make the choices and let people bash him for it. Now, when they're in a position to define the law so that everyone knows what's legal, they're balking.
------------------------------------------------------------------
again, blind ignorance and party bias.
yes, the bill address issues that are currently not covered under current policy like internet and cell phones. but that is not what the dems are balking at. and those provisions do not warrent giving one branch of the government absolute authority without recoarse.
the dems are not afriad of the internet and cell phones. infact, they raise more money online than the repubs do.
they are afraid of handing authority without recoarse to one branch of government without recoarse, and in particular, to an addministraition that has already breached our trust in a significant manner that has cost the lives of many human beings.......already without any recoarse. they will all get a presidential pardon when they walk out of office when they should be standing trial for war crimes and treason.
why did we go to Iraq?
turned out to not be true.
hundreds of thousands of human beings died, who will be held accountable?
no one.
the moral majority working hard for......someone.
BrownDuck. Not going to go point for point here, cause it's getting ridiculously long (even for me) and we're basically picking over minor meanings and interpretations in FISA and PAA.
Here's the thing though. It appears as though there are two primary concerns you have:
1. The targeted person only has to be "reasonably suspected" of being outside the US.
and
2. There's nothing to prevent a US persons communications from being included in the tap.
Is that basically it? Everything else you've talked about seem to pretty much just be variations of those two, so I'll respond to each one:
1. I really don't think this is much more then a semantic change. More to the point, it maintains the specific intent of FISA. The whole point of the FISA rules were specifically to ensure that taps were limited to people outside US soil, while ensuring that every legitimate target could be tapped. Now, they set a list of criteria (the four you quoted) because at that time there was no legitimate need to tap someone outside the US using any technique that violated those rules. That's because back in those days, wires were analog switched and physically laid out. If you wanted to listen in on someone in Algeria, you built a tap in Algeria. The prohibition on placing them on US soil was in response to abuses of the day where the government would use the excuse of foreign surveillance to tap people living in the US.
The problem is that this is no longer a reasonable restriction. Remember. The objective is to allow the government to conduct legitimate intelligence gathering on foreign targets while protecting the rights of US persons. But some of the restrictions, which made perfect sense back in the day, are now making legitimate intelligence gathering much more difficult and cumbersome then it should be (and moreso then it used to be). Cell phones and email all by themselves make a couple of the restrictions virtually impossible to get around and would make practically *all* foreign surveillance fall under the heading of requiring FISA warrants (which was never the intent. Those are supposed to be for "exceptions" where a domestic surveillance is needed).
I'll concede that the "reasonably suspect" language may be a bit broad, however, there does appear to be reasonable amounts of checks involved (ie: Folks with real careers at stake have to sign off on them). I wouldn't mind if they changed the language to "reasonably suspect" *and* doesn't meet criteria 101(f)(1), since that would prevent the potential abuse of targeting someone outside the US in order to listen in on someone inside the US.
I'll also point out though, that at least from what I've read of the Dems complaints, this *isn't* one of the bits they're most upset about. They seem most hung up on the fact that you can't sue companies that cooperate with the government, which seems like a really odd thing to me. It's like they're perfectly ok with the surveillance as long as they get to allow "the people" to sue over it after the fact. Frankly, I'm not sure how you can even defend that other then as a simple "we want to ***** over large telecommunications companies". It makes no sense...
2. This one's really the easy one. Honestly, they can already do that. If you call someone who's being targeted for foreign surveillance, they get to listen to your conversation. That's not "new". It's legal under FISA. This is one of the great red herrings of this issue. The fear that any US citizen's conversations could be recorded. Well. DUH! Of course they can be. If you make an international call, your call can be recorded. This is nothing new. You have no expectation of privacy once that call leaves US soil.
You never have had that protection and the PAA doesn't change it one bit. The protection and guarantee is that if you are in the US and you call someone in the US, the government cannot listen in on your conversation without a warrant. And guess what? That hasn't changed. The only difference is that the government has to "reasonably suspect" that the person you're calling is outside the US. Um... From your perspective that's not really any different, right? Don't you suppose that the government's going to have a good idea whether the phone you're calling is outside the US or not? Now, maybe they'll lie about it, but that's not any different either. If they were just going to lie, they could lie about any of the other criteria as well.
You really aren't losing anything on that level. While I'll grant that there are a couple minor points I'd have rather been written slightly differently overall the need for updated rules outweigh those problems. The reality is that at the end of the day if the intelligence agencies and people signing off on their activities really want to lie to you and listen to your phone calls, there isn't a whole lot you can do about it. It's no less illegal under PAA then it was pre-PAA. And it's no more or less difficult to catch them if they violate the rules. You shouldn't blindly trust your government, obviously, but you should also look at whether a given restriction really protects you or not, or whether it just seems like it does.
I really think this just can't be said enough. If the agencies involved want to lie about who they're targeting and why/how, they can do it under existing FISA rules just as easily as under the PAA. If anything, enforcing strict FISA rules increases the likelyhood of such deceptions since it places a whole lot of legitimate surveillance under a higher set of restrictions then it should making "breaking the rules" seem more attractive to someone who's job is to get the information he's supposed to get. Can you imagine if you're trying to track some terrorist group that's rotating through disposable cell phones faster then you can re-acquire tap approval? The temptation to just "do what needs to be done" would get to be pretty strong, right? And I think we'd all agree that maybe in this case you should, even if it's technically illegal, right?
But if they get in the habit of doing that, then your rights and privacy is at risk. Better to have a set of rules that allow the intelligence folks to do their jobs while still protecting our rights (at least on paper), because that way they're less likely to slippery slope themselves into domestic spying (which is what prompted FISA in the first place).
Here's the thing though. It appears as though there are two primary concerns you have:
1. The targeted person only has to be "reasonably suspected" of being outside the US.
and
2. There's nothing to prevent a US persons communications from being included in the tap.
Is that basically it? Everything else you've talked about seem to pretty much just be variations of those two, so I'll respond to each one:
1. I really don't think this is much more then a semantic change. More to the point, it maintains the specific intent of FISA. The whole point of the FISA rules were specifically to ensure that taps were limited to people outside US soil, while ensuring that every legitimate target could be tapped. Now, they set a list of criteria (the four you quoted) because at that time there was no legitimate need to tap someone outside the US using any technique that violated those rules. That's because back in those days, wires were analog switched and physically laid out. If you wanted to listen in on someone in Algeria, you built a tap in Algeria. The prohibition on placing them on US soil was in response to abuses of the day where the government would use the excuse of foreign surveillance to tap people living in the US.
The problem is that this is no longer a reasonable restriction. Remember. The objective is to allow the government to conduct legitimate intelligence gathering on foreign targets while protecting the rights of US persons. But some of the restrictions, which made perfect sense back in the day, are now making legitimate intelligence gathering much more difficult and cumbersome then it should be (and moreso then it used to be). Cell phones and email all by themselves make a couple of the restrictions virtually impossible to get around and would make practically *all* foreign surveillance fall under the heading of requiring FISA warrants (which was never the intent. Those are supposed to be for "exceptions" where a domestic surveillance is needed).
I'll concede that the "reasonably suspect" language may be a bit broad, however, there does appear to be reasonable amounts of checks involved (ie: Folks with real careers at stake have to sign off on them). I wouldn't mind if they changed the language to "reasonably suspect" *and* doesn't meet criteria 101(f)(1), since that would prevent the potential abuse of targeting someone outside the US in order to listen in on someone inside the US.
I'll also point out though, that at least from what I've read of the Dems complaints, this *isn't* one of the bits they're most upset about. They seem most hung up on the fact that you can't sue companies that cooperate with the government, which seems like a really odd thing to me. It's like they're perfectly ok with the surveillance as long as they get to allow "the people" to sue over it after the fact. Frankly, I'm not sure how you can even defend that other then as a simple "we want to ***** over large telecommunications companies". It makes no sense...
2. This one's really the easy one. Honestly, they can already do that. If you call someone who's being targeted for foreign surveillance, they get to listen to your conversation. That's not "new". It's legal under FISA. This is one of the great red herrings of this issue. The fear that any US citizen's conversations could be recorded. Well. DUH! Of course they can be. If you make an international call, your call can be recorded. This is nothing new. You have no expectation of privacy once that call leaves US soil.
You never have had that protection and the PAA doesn't change it one bit. The protection and guarantee is that if you are in the US and you call someone in the US, the government cannot listen in on your conversation without a warrant. And guess what? That hasn't changed. The only difference is that the government has to "reasonably suspect" that the person you're calling is outside the US. Um... From your perspective that's not really any different, right? Don't you suppose that the government's going to have a good idea whether the phone you're calling is outside the US or not? Now, maybe they'll lie about it, but that's not any different either. If they were just going to lie, they could lie about any of the other criteria as well.
You really aren't losing anything on that level. While I'll grant that there are a couple minor points I'd have rather been written slightly differently overall the need for updated rules outweigh those problems. The reality is that at the end of the day if the intelligence agencies and people signing off on their activities really want to lie to you and listen to your phone calls, there isn't a whole lot you can do about it. It's no less illegal under PAA then it was pre-PAA. And it's no more or less difficult to catch them if they violate the rules. You shouldn't blindly trust your government, obviously, but you should also look at whether a given restriction really protects you or not, or whether it just seems like it does.
I really think this just can't be said enough. If the agencies involved want to lie about who they're targeting and why/how, they can do it under existing FISA rules just as easily as under the PAA. If anything, enforcing strict FISA rules increases the likelyhood of such deceptions since it places a whole lot of legitimate surveillance under a higher set of restrictions then it should making "breaking the rules" seem more attractive to someone who's job is to get the information he's supposed to get. Can you imagine if you're trying to track some terrorist group that's rotating through disposable cell phones faster then you can re-acquire tap approval? The temptation to just "do what needs to be done" would get to be pretty strong, right? And I think we'd all agree that maybe in this case you should, even if it's technically illegal, right?
But if they get in the habit of doing that, then your rights and privacy is at risk. Better to have a set of rules that allow the intelligence folks to do their jobs while still protecting our rights (at least on paper), because that way they're less likely to slippery slope themselves into domestic spying (which is what prompted FISA in the first place).
King Nobby wrote:
More words please
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They seem most hung up on the fact that you can't sue companies that cooperate with the government, which seems like a really odd thing to me. It's like they're perfectly ok with the surveillance as long as they get to allow "the people" to sue over it after the fact. Frankly, I'm not sure how you can even defend that other then as a simple "we want to ***** over large telecommunications companies"
It's my understanding that there are already a number of lawsuits in progress against these companies, which is why the Dems took this particular provision out.
Liberals taking the side of the "little guy" against big business isn't exactly something new.
"The Rich are there to take all of the money & pay none of the taxes, the middle class is there to do all the work and pay all the taxes, and the poor are there to scare the crap out of the middle class." -George Carlin
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Democrats immediately said that the expiration of the temporary law would have little, if any, immediate impact on intelligence gathering. "He has nothing to offer but fear," House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) told reporters after Bush's address.
"I regret your reckless attempt to manufacture a crisis over the reauthorization of foreign surveillance laws," Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) said in a letter to Bush, in defense of his colleagues in the House. "Instead of needlessly frightening the country, you should work with Congress in a calm, constructive way."
To be fair, extremities are the only way Pubbies can communicate.
"WE MUST BE ALLOWED TO WIRE TAP WITHOUT A WARRANT OR ELSE TERRORISTS WILL MAKE TEH SUN 'SPLODE!"
Seriously, what's the problem with getting a warrant, via sufficient evidence, and the courts? Next on the chopping block? Patriot Act. Thank you Sir, would you like fired with that order of cheese and whine?
Seriously, what's the problem with getting a warrant, via sufficient evidence, and the courts?
The problem is that if you had sufficient evidence, you likely wouldn't need dragnet wiretaps of thousands of foreign nationals.
Here's the problem: The GOP is not wrong when it states we're less safe without this program. We are. It's not arguable. Trying to argue that it's equally safe to have the possibility of a court disallowing the gathering of intel is the wrong way to approach it. The way to approach is it that safety doesn't supersede liberty. We'd be safer if everyone was required to carry a dossier with their entire life's history in it and give it to every person they met. We'd be safer if we executed people who get 3 speeding tickets in a year. We'd be safer if we kept poor young black men in ghettos with no opportunity of social advancement. Well, I guess we're pretty safe from that one, already.
The point being, There has to be a line where liberty outweighs safety, and it should be long before the government coo-pts information infrastructure to spy on it's own citizens.
Disclaimer:
To make a long story short, I don't take any responsibility for anything I post here. It's not news, it's not truth, it's not serious. It's parody. It's satire. It's bitter. It's angsty. Your mother's a *****. You like to jack off dogs. That's right, you heard me. You like to grab that dog by the bone and rub it like a ski pole. Your dad? Gay. Your priest? Straight. **** off and let me post. It's not true, it's all in good fun. Now go away.
To make a long story short, I don't take any responsibility for anything I post here. It's not news, it's not truth, it's not serious. It's parody. It's satire. It's bitter. It's angsty. Your mother's a *****. You like to jack off dogs. That's right, you heard me. You like to grab that dog by the bone and rub it like a ski pole. Your dad? Gay. Your priest? Straight. **** off and let me post. It's not true, it's all in good fun. Now go away.
Smasharoo wrote:
The point being, There has to be a line where liberty outweighs safety, and it should be long before the government coo-pts information infrastructure to spy on it's own citizens.
Absolutely. However, we also have to be looking at the actual line and not just automatically assuming every surveillance program has crossed it. While I applaud the cause of liberty, there are far too many people who champion it by simply opposing any and everything no matter how reasonable or necessary. It puts us in a "boy who cried wolf" situation where the public becomes so desensitized to privacy advocates screaming about how any action by government is some horrible breach of liberty that they're unable to see when one's actually happening.
IMO, this is one of those cases. The actual intrusion on your life is incredibly minimal. More to the point, the delta of liberty here is virtually non-existent. The criteria set in FISA for warrants were designed to ensure that any wiretap targeting a "US person" (ie: someone legally on US soil) required special permission in the form of a warrant while anyone not on US soil did not. So replacing that criteria with "if we're really sure he's not on US soil" isn't much more then a semantic difference. It's exactly the intent of the earlier criteria.
The reason for the change is obvious. With cell phones and email being "global", it's quite possible for someone's service to be hosted in different countries then where the phone physically is. Used to be if you were placing a call from country A, your phone call absolutely had to route through physical wires located in country A. That's no longer the case, so making the location of the wires and/or routing systems part of the criteria for allowing a warrant-free wiretap is silly.
Email and web services are even more severe. Under FISA, if terrorist A and terrorist B, both located outside the US are communicating by using their gmail accounts hosted *inside* the US, it's uncertain if the government has to get a FISA warrant to tap their conversations. Is the "endpoint" of the communication where the data is stored on the email server? Or the location of the email client that's reading/sending it? If I'm tapped into the guy's computer while he's reading/writing email on said server, is my tap in or outside of the US? This is a ridiculous legal gray area that shouldn't really be a problem. Common sense tells us that if the guy who's email I'm reading is not a US citizen and is himself outside of the US, I should be able to utilize any means I can to read any communications he makes without any sort of warrant needed. The fact that it's possible for someone in a foreign country to communicate with someone else in yet another foreign country by sending information between two computers located inside the US is a result of the massive changes brought about by the rise of the information age and was certainly not envisioned by those who wrote the original FISA restrictions.
If a group of terrorists chooses to communicate by posting coded messages on the Zam website, does the government need a FISA warrant to obtain the information? Or can they just ask Zam nicely for the posting info? Can they gain that information with a court order? Can Zam be sued for providing it?
There's a point at which you're taking "liberty" to a ridiculous extreme. I'll also go back to my original point that if you think the Dems opposition has anything at all to do with liberty and freedom I think you've been holding your head in a bucket of sand too long. This is the party that has an agenda designed to increase the degree to which the government can interfere in your life. Everything from what you can do in your leisure time, to what sort of medicines you can have, to what jobs you get, pay you receive, and how much of your money you get to keep. Those are the things that Dems want to take away from the private citizen and put in the hands of the government...
But they're here to protect your liberty? By blocking the ability of the government to spy on people who are not US citizens and are not on US soil? Does no one see the hypocrisy here?
King Nobby wrote:
More words please
MO, this is one of those cases. The actual intrusion on your life is incredibly minimal.
Terrible argument. The impact of constant government monitoring of all my communications would be minimal, too, as I'm pretty boring from a law enforcement point of view. Would that make it "ok"?
There's a point at which you're taking "liberty" to a ridiculous extreme. I'll also go back to my original point that if you think the Dems opposition has anything at all to do with liberty and freedom I think you've been holding your head in a bucket of sand too long.
Let me reiterate my point that I DO NOT CARE what the motivations are behind actions that increase my liberty. Nor should you, unless you've been abjectly lying about your political philosophy forever.
Disclaimer:
To make a long story short, I don't take any responsibility for anything I post here. It's not news, it's not truth, it's not serious. It's parody. It's satire. It's bitter. It's angsty. Your mother's a *****. You like to jack off dogs. That's right, you heard me. You like to grab that dog by the bone and rub it like a ski pole. Your dad? Gay. Your priest? Straight. **** off and let me post. It's not true, it's all in good fun. Now go away.
To make a long story short, I don't take any responsibility for anything I post here. It's not news, it's not truth, it's not serious. It's parody. It's satire. It's bitter. It's angsty. Your mother's a *****. You like to jack off dogs. That's right, you heard me. You like to grab that dog by the bone and rub it like a ski pole. Your dad? Gay. Your priest? Straight. **** off and let me post. It's not true, it's all in good fun. Now go away.
I dont see what all the fuss is about....
Georgie Bush said "They hate us for our freedom".
And he knows 'stuff'. Like Gbaji. He knows 'stuff' too.
So it would seem to me to be an obvious step to remove the 'freedoms' that are causing Abdul and Omar inc to hate you all so much.
Hence, after several years of "freedom removal', they no longer hate you for your freedom to take baby food onto 'planes. And they no longer hate you for being able to borrow library books without it being recorded. You are no longer detested for your ability to walk down a street without being filmed by a multitude of CCTV's. You are no longer hated for your rights of habeus corpus. And so on.....
Removing your rights of privacy by allowing the FBI or whoever to listen in your phone calls whenever they feel the need, or to read your mail, or to intercept your e-mail, is all part of the fwuffy-wuffy caring efforts of your government to keep you safe from the nasty men with beards and moustaches.
Why everyone except gbaji and Georgie-worgie cant understand this is beyond me.
At this rate, the US citizen and the freedom hating terrorist will be the best of mates in no time!
Georgie Bush said "They hate us for our freedom".
And he knows 'stuff'. Like Gbaji. He knows 'stuff' too.
So it would seem to me to be an obvious step to remove the 'freedoms' that are causing Abdul and Omar inc to hate you all so much.
Hence, after several years of "freedom removal', they no longer hate you for your freedom to take baby food onto 'planes. And they no longer hate you for being able to borrow library books without it being recorded. You are no longer detested for your ability to walk down a street without being filmed by a multitude of CCTV's. You are no longer hated for your rights of habeus corpus. And so on.....
Removing your rights of privacy by allowing the FBI or whoever to listen in your phone calls whenever they feel the need, or to read your mail, or to intercept your e-mail, is all part of the fwuffy-wuffy caring efforts of your government to keep you safe from the nasty men with beards and moustaches.
Why everyone except gbaji and Georgie-worgie cant understand this is beyond me.
At this rate, the US citizen and the freedom hating terrorist will be the best of mates in no time!
"If you have selfish, ignorant citizens, you're gonna get selfish, ignorant leaders". Carlin.
Smasharoo wrote:
MO, this is one of those cases. The actual intrusion on your life is incredibly minimal.
Terrible argument. The impact of constant government monitoring of all my communications would be minimal, too, as I'm pretty boring from a law enforcement point of view. Would that make it "ok"?
No. But I'm not supporting "constant government monitoring of all your/my/our communications".
See how that's a strawman? Which, in case you're paying attention, makes it a terrible argument.
The relevant question is: "Do the changes to FISA written into the PAA represent an unreasonable imposition on the liberties of US citizens?". When you give your answer include a clear description of exactly which changes are unreasonable, explain why they are unreasonable, and explain how the existing rules under FISA are *not* unreasonable (ie: what is the "delta" of liberty represented here).
Yeah. Just once I'd like to see someone on this forum do that instead of simply spouting rhetoric. Not likely to happen though...
Quote:
Let me reiterate my point that I DO NOT CARE what the motivations are behind actions that increase my liberty. Nor should you, unless you've been abjectly lying about your political philosophy forever.
You're assuming something you haven't proven or even supported with argument: that the opposition to the PAA in any way actually increases our liberty.
I don't think it represents any unreasonable restriction on my liberty. I believe that the security benefits far outweigh the absolutely tiny changes within (I've already said I would prefer some slightly different language, but I believe that the "spirit" of FISA is intact). So, yeah, I suspect the motives of the Dems here. It's not really about liberty. It's about painting the "other side" as bad guys. It's about making people think that they're standing up for something, when they're really simply backing away from making a decision (else why not pass the law they want instead of simply not voting on this one?).
And worse yet, it's yet another example of the Dems willingly ******** over foreign policy during a pretty delicate time in order to gain petty political favor at home. While not on the same scale as the disaster that resulted from Murtha's demand for troop withdrawal by summer of 2006 (which caused the upsweep in violence in Iraq and likely resulted in tens of thousands of deaths), it's motivated by the same thing. Get power back at any cost. And if the "cost" is US lives, who cares? If it's the ability of our government to prevent the next 9/11, so be it. They don't care. They just want power. And they're willing to lie, cheat, and kill (literally) to do it.
So yeah. I think motivation counts for a lot. If the guy telling you something gains by having you believe what he's saying, that should always be taken into account, don't you think? I do...
King Nobby wrote:
More words please
See!
I told you all that gbaji 'knows' stuff that the rest of us have no hope of ever being able to perceive...
It may look like the ravings of a paranoid dimwit, but he's deep. Deep, I tell ya!
I told you all that gbaji 'knows' stuff that the rest of us have no hope of ever being able to perceive...
It may look like the ravings of a paranoid dimwit, but he's deep. Deep, I tell ya!
"If you have selfish, ignorant citizens, you're gonna get selfish, ignorant leaders". Carlin.
gbaji wrote:
Yeah. Just once I'd like to see someone on this forum do that instead of simply spouting rhetoric. Not likely to happen though...
Ignoring my posts then, eh? Let's skip the "rhetoric" and get down to it:
The PAA gives the director of national intelligence and the attorney general the right to begin surveillance on anyone they choose, so long as they reasonably believe the person to be located on foreign soil. There is no requirement for judicial oversight, and in fact, the act specifically states that even though the authorization for this surveillance must be CC'd to the panel of judges defined by FISA, said authorization must remain under lock and key, until such time as the legality of the authorization would be challenged. Catch? Nobody knows about it, and the only way to challenge it would be to petition against a direct request by the surveillance team to surrender information and/or facilities for the purpose of said surveillance.
Regardless of what the act actually grants, the mere fact that it does so without any level of judicial oversight is the problem. As soon as you remove the oversight, you inherently increase the probability that such privilege will be misused or outright abused for unconstitutional or unethical purposes.
I have not heard one good argument yet as to why the person authorizing the surveillance should not be required to notify someone on the judicial side of their intentions, and then, follow up on that authorization with enough details to justify the authorization once surveillance has begun. All that has been said is that "it's too secret and too time sensitive to get permission". *********
I'm coming into this a bit late, but simply enough this argument can be summed up as:
"HAY, I'd like to challenge the government because I've been wrongfully wiretapped, but I cannot have the records if such of an authorization, because it's under lock and key and can only be released by their consent, but they won't hear my case because I have no proof I was wiretapped because I can't access it..." You get the idea.
Theoretical situation, of course, but it finely presents the catch-22 that anyone caught by wiretapping could face. As stated before, this is not in line with the checks-and-balanced put forth by the constitution, and thus needs to be rectified. End of story. All of the partisan rhetoric in the world is not going to convince me otherwise- this shouldn't even be a partisan issue.
Agreed.
"HAY, I'd like to challenge the government because I've been wrongfully wiretapped, but I cannot have the records if such of an authorization, because it's under lock and key and can only be released by their consent, but they won't hear my case because I have no proof I was wiretapped because I can't access it..." You get the idea.
Theoretical situation, of course, but it finely presents the catch-22 that anyone caught by wiretapping could face. As stated before, this is not in line with the checks-and-balanced put forth by the constitution, and thus needs to be rectified. End of story. All of the partisan rhetoric in the world is not going to convince me otherwise- this shouldn't even be a partisan issue.
Quote:
I have not heard one good argument yet as to why the person authorizing the surveillance should not be required to notify someone on the judicial side of their intentions, and then, follow up on that authorization with enough details to justify the authorization once surveillance has begun. All that has been said is that "it's too secret and too time sensitive to get permission". Bullsh*t
Agreed.
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