First of all Totem,I used McNamara as one of many people who were actually there and part of the decision making at the time to counter gbaji's argument that,by ALL historical account,Japan was still in shape to pose a threat to the U.S even after the bomb.That McNamara went on being an incompetent secretary of defense some 15 years later is irrelevant.If he was so incompetent,being the architect of the saturation bombing strategy,would you say that firebombing every major Japanese city was bad decision making? But fair enough, you don't like McNamara and neither do I.
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100,000 people is 100,000 people
Funny how you say that while in every other of your post on the subject you clearly make distinction between American lives and any others.That's the difference between me and you. You value an American life more than any other while I just see people. 100 000 dead Americans or 100 000 dead Japanese is the same to me, that's 100 000 dead people.
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What makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win? Simple. The victor gets to write history
Yea we call that victor's justice.Too bad you missed the point.The question in itself was the answer.From an absolute point of view it is immoral win or lose.
Necessity doesn't legitimize an immoral act also.And since you didn't like McNamara on the subject, allow me to quote someone far more intelligent who spent years studying the question.
" the Allies' World War policy of "strategic" or "area" bombing: the leveling of first German and then Japanese cities in attacks specifically aimed at civilian populations. This American and British policy was by no means simply an imitation of **** tactics, as is sometimes claimed. The ***** had indeed bombed civilians in Guernica, Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, and Coventry, but these attacks were on a more limited scale. The British and American military had prepared well prior to World War II to wage an air war specifically aimed at "the enemy civil population, and, in particular ... the industrial workers." But the British, in initiating the bombings, and the Americans in later joining and expanding them, justified the enterprise with the sense that they were combating an unparalleled evil. In that way, **** war-making and mass killing brought about a response that was itself violent in the extreme and a form of global salvation through the flames of destruction.
Americans offered a similar justification for the even more extreme devastation caused by their policy of "saturation bombing"-the massive, carefully planned firebombings of virtually all of Japan's highly flammable cities. By that time, a military strategy of attacks on civilian populations had become almost routine. To be sure, civilians had been targeted in modern warfare since at least the time of the American Civil War, but the firestorms that engulfed cities like Dresden and Tokyo and killed many of thousands of civilians in single days could be said to have rendered such policies apocalyptic. The Tokyo raid on the night of 9/10 killed more people, at least initially, than the atomic bombings of either Hiroshima or Nagasaki.
Leon Blum, the French Socialist leader, once said that he was certain the Allies would triumph over the ***** but feared that, in doing so, we would become like them. The sad truth is that in the realm of strategic bombing we went further than they did. We were all too susceptible to escalating twentieth-century technological slaughter in the name of world redemption."
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Most historians, pointing to Japan's desperate state in early August 1945 and its series of surrender overtures, have concluded that use of the bomb was in no sense necessary. There were many factors that nonetheless went into the decision to use it-including technological and bureaucratic momentum, domestic political considerations, the doctrine of unconditional surrender we had proclaimed, and the possibility that we would be combating the Soviet Union, our then-ally, in a postwar world. But from the beginning the stated American reason, which certainly had its importance for decision-makers, was that of ending the war quickly and of "saving lives"
"It is fair to say that simply building and possessing nuclear weapons creates the potential for an atrocity-producing situation: any assumption of a dangerous threat to American security could initiate a strong technological and psychological momentum toward use. This is likely to be true of any nuclear-weapons-possessing nation or group, and one can never assume that a wise statesman will appear to prevent an apocalyptic act. For nuclear weapons are inherently apocalyptic, and with them America took over a form of the ownership of death, believing it could now be operated in the service of good. That ownership was demonstrated, awesomely and tragically, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, by means of a revolutionary equation: one plane, one bomb, one city. This was an apotheosis of apocalyptic warfare."
-Robert J. Lifton
The last paragraph kinda sums up my reasoning as of why nobody should have nuclear weapons.Even the most rational person on earth if put in truman's shoes would probably do the same thing he did.
"the indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons will destroy nations. Is it right and proper that today there are 7500 strategic offensive nuclear warheads, of which 2500 are on 15 minute alert, to be launched by the decision of one human being?"