gbaji wrote:
I'd then point out that since you made this statement in direct response to Neph's, that this meant that you intended it to be exactly an example of why it is legitimate to blame Bush for the current status of NK's nuclear program (else why mention it in response to his statement?).
You'd have been wrong though so it's good that you didn't embarass yourself further like that.
gbaji wrote:
With Iraq we're blamed for ignoring the international community as a whole and "going it alone". In NK, however, the same voices attack the decision to stick with the six party talks and insist that we should deal with NK directly.
The two don't really compare in that context. In the former, we were looking for 'permission' to invade Iraq because we felt that an invasion was in order. We weren't looking to talk it out with Iraq or have any form of diplomatic discourse with Saddam; Bush just wanted to invade. When you're going to invade and then rebuild a nation, it makes sense to have as much international support behind you as possible. Bush shrugged this off in his desire to get what he wanted.
In Korea, an invasion was never an option. We were trying to resolve the issue diplomatically and, at the same time, refusing to engage in the diplomatic talks that the target nation desired. Former U.S. National Security Advisor Donald Gregg phrased the problem with this better than I could:
Donald Gregg wrote:
Why won't the Bush administration talk bilaterally and substantively with NK, as the Brits (and eventually the US) did with Libya? Because the Bush administration sees diplomacy as something to be engaged in with another country as a reward for that country's good behavior. They seem not to see diplomacy as a tool to be used with antagonistic countries or parties, that might bring about an improvement in the behaviour of such entities, and a resolution to the issues that trouble us. Thus we do not talk to Iran, Syria, Hizballah or North Korea. We only talk to our friends -- a huge mistake.
And another quote from the Center of Nonproliferation Studies which says about my thoughts on why this was a mistake:
The CNS wrote:
Pyongyang has demanded bilateral negotiations with the United States, but the Bush administration flatly rejects them as "a concession" or "rewarding bad behavior." Bilateral and multilateral negotiations are not mutually exclusive, but the Bush administration has viewed the two options as a zero-sum proposition. In fact, they are complementary because they would bring North Korea back to the negotiating table at little or no cost to the U.S., and they would also increase the prospects for the institutionalization of the six-party framework for dealing with a number of other regional issues after settling the North Korean nuclear problem.
In both cases, the common thread of criticism is that Bush decided that he was going to make the call and damn those who might disagree. In Iraq, it was the decision to invade despite international opposition. In N. Korea, it's a decision that no one is getting what they want until Bush gets what
he wants first. It's not a question of "Here there was a lot of countries and here there's not!" but rather a question of Bush's conceit and unwillingness to expand his policies beyond his own desires.