Yes, US intelligence was faulty in overestimating Iraq's WMD holdings. However, the very same intelligence says we are in little danger from Sadam's Iraq - unless we invade.
I have repeated this since before the war. It is not my opinion that the US will be less safe if we invade Iraq - personally I just don't know - but the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) says so.
To utterly confuse the issue, the NIE was only partially declassified months before the war - but literally only hours before the US congress voted.
On 20 March, 2003, the US launched strikes against Iraq.
Legally, this was based on the the 2 October 2002 resolution of the US House and Senate which says:
US Congress wrote:
SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
(a) AUTHORIZATION- The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to
(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
The NIE had concluded before the war Sadam was unlikely to attack the US unless we invaded. Further, he was unlikely to assist terrorists with any WMD unless invaded. They concluded UN inspections did help detect and deter WMD development - and since inspectors returned Nov 18, 2002 (five days after Iraq's government accepted the UN resolution) neither (1) nor (2) above were satisfied.
Their review of intelligence as of Oct 2002 is here:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.pdf
However, this is not the full report. The fuller report was released on 18 July 2003 during a White House Briefing:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030718-8.html
What is being released - virtually four months after the war began - is just the "Key Judgements" from the prewar NIE.
If you scroll down about 1/5 of the whole way, you'll see the first question:
WhiteHouse.gov wrote:
Q We don't have page 24.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I'm sorry. If you'll go -- it looks like a blank paper, but there's a little box at the bottom that says "uranium acquisition." Now, this is taken from an excerpt of the overall highly classified nuclear chapter of the 90-page NIE.
What is on page 24? It was later released and is reproduced here:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/nie2002_iraq_wmd.htm
Scroll down toward the bottom and you'll find:
The CIA in Oct 2002 wrote:
Confidence Levels for Selected Key Judgments in This Estimate
High Confidence:
* Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions.
* We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs.
* Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles.
* Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once it acquires sufficient weapons-grad fissile material
Moderate Confidence:
* Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one but is likely to have a weapon by 2007 to 2009. (See INR alternative view, page 84).
Low Confidence
* When Saddam would use weapons of mass destruction.
* Whether Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks against the US Homeland.
* Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or biological weapons with al-Qa'ida.
This is expanded on in the text just above the previous quote (which was just a summary):
Quote:
We have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam would use WMD.
* Saddam could decide to use chemical and biological warfare (CBW) preemptively against U.S. forces, friends, and allies in the region in an attempt to disrupt U.S. war preparations and undermine the political will of the Coalition.
* Saddam might use CBW after an initial advance into Iraqi territory, but early use of WMD could foreclose diplomatic options for stalling the US advance.
* He probably would use CBW when be perceived he irretrievably had lost control of the military and security situation, but we are unlikely to know when Saddam reaches that point.
* We judge that Saddam would be more likely to use chemical weapons than biological weapons on the battlefield.
* Saddam historically has maintained tight control over the use of WMD; however, he probably has provided contingency instructions to his commanders to use CBW in specific circumstances.
Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger cause for making war.
Iraq probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the U.S. Homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge. Such attacks--more likely with biological than chemical agents--probably would be carried out by special forces or intelligence operatives.
* The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) probably has been directed to conduct clandestine attacks against US and Allied interests in the Middle East in the event the United States takes action against Iraq. The US probably would be the primary means by which Iraq would attempt to conduct any CBW attacks on the US Homeland, although we have no specific intelligence information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks against US territory.
Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only an organization such as al-Qa'ida--with worldwide reach and extensive terrorist infrastructure, and already engaged in a life-or-death struggle against the United States--could perpetrate the type of terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct.
* In such circumstances, he might decide that the extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists in conducting a CBW attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him
That this was known, but not released, in general, caused great frusturation on the part of Senate democrats.
You can listen to audio of the Democratic lead on the Sentae Intelligence Subommittee (Graham of Flordia) speaking to a radio program about this here:
http://www.thislife.org/ra/227.ram
(RealPlayer required ick).
The direct contradition between the NIE saying Iraq is less of a threat if we don't invade (e.g. invading Iraq leads the US into greater danger, not less) and the President saying we must invade Iraq to protect the US leads Graham to ask the radio show staff to ask the President (since the White House won't answer Graham himself) if the President has additional knowledge outside the NIE.
The NIE is supposed to be basically a sum total review of intelligence - to quote the whitehouse.gov link above again (this is about 40% of the way down:
Quote:
Q But there were overall concerns about significant --
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To take that question, Terry, there are six -- the way the NIE works is that there are six agencies -- and there's a lot of other agencies that funnel through that, like, all the services have their agencies -- that work to put together this document. And in this they make a conclusion. Yes, there is a footnote. I'm not sure -- if you use that as your test, as your standard, then any decision the President has made, he has to disclose every dissent: the President today put forward a $20 billion tax cut. I'm here to tell you today that one of my advisors thought it should only be $18 billion. That's not the way it works.
In short - any dissent, any stray opinion, is included in the full NIE. Clearly we cannot release the whole 90 page NIE on Iraq because (assumedly) each piece of evidence is discussed in detail and it would thus comprimise sources.
However, not to release *all* of the key esitmates (including the critical confidence levels table and subsequent discussion of Sadam's relative non-threat to the US unless we attack) is essentially fraud.
The actual intelligence was *not* fixed by the Whitehouse. The full report was edited down to the point that what was released was only what the administration wanted the Congress to know.
I'm not saying that we should not have gone to war, only that our reasoning to go to war was directly contradicted by our own intelligence services. Perhaps the most direct conflict is in the Congresses Authorization of force:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-2.html
Quote:
Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself;
and the NIE:
Quote:
Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger cause for making war.
Iraq probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the U.S. Homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge. Such attacks--more likely with biological than chemical agents--probably would be carried out by special forces or intelligence operatives.
There were Democrats on the Subcommittee who actually got the entire NIE on Iraq. They tried to communicate this to others but the story seemed to have "no legs" in the press. In the end, Graham and 22 other Senators voted against the joint (house-senate) war resolution of 2002:
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=2&vote=00237
One wonders what the vote would have been had all the Senators had access to the entire NIE - but they all should have listened to their colleagues and if they did not do so it is their personal responsibility.
Currently many sources are reporting the President had "better" intelligence then the NIE - this is hotly refuted by the Whitehouse:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051113.html
and perhaps the whitehouse is being honest. However, the NIE as released to the sentate was badly misleading. Generally, you don't exclude the conclusions and include details on one side of an issue and call that unbiased.
And note that the Washington Post allegation that the Congress did not have enough time to evaluate the NIE is unrefuted.