xythex wrote:
It depends on how it is done. Some systems actually take an image of your thumbprint and use that for security, thats bad. If someone gets ahold of your thumbprint from anything you are done for security-wise until you grow a new thumb.
Newer more advanced systems take the thumbprint and create a secure hash by mixing the digital image with a random number to create a key pair. Even if someone were to get a hold of the key they would be unable to reconstruct a thumbprint from it. The reading device never retains or transmits the thumbprint. If your key is somehow comprimised, you can simply generate a new key pair.
Exactly. It's no different then any other security system. One way hash's work great, the print is just used as one part of the hash.
That's really an irrelevant issue though. Someone can just as easily lift your fingerprint off a glass and make a slide that will fool the scanner.
The point is that the print replaces the card. Nothing more. All your ATM card has on it is your account number (it's got more, but that's all that's really needed). It's kind of like when you log into a system. The system must know *who* is logging in (account name/number), and then take some form of password/PIN in order to authenticate that you are the person the account is listed to. All the thumprint does is tell the ATM who's trying to log in. It should always be accompanied by a password of some kind for true security.
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A system like that I am not opposed to as it is very convienent. I would imagine most monetary systems would still require a PIN along with the thumbprint.
Exactly correct. However, at least according to one statement in the article, they're trying to eliminate that part of it. That's what I think is a horrible mistake. Anything you can carry with you physically can be stolen or replicated. Someone can make a copy of your print sufficient to identify you to the ATM pretty easily (and as pointed out, you can't change your fingerprint if that happens). The only way to make this secure is to also require a PIN (preferably an alphanumeric rather then the pure numerics they use right now).
There are lots of examples of manufacturers of products selling them as "secure" but designed in some cases specifically to be less secure. A fingerprint scanner without a PIN is one of those. Heh. One of the classic examples of poorly thought security is those cars with the "keyless entry" keypads. Ever looked at those things? They have 5 buttons. But the numbers on each button are paired (1/2, 3/4, 5/6, 7/8, 9/0 for example). Why do that? Clearly, there are realy only 5 buttons. By putting the numbers on them in that way, they encourage people to use numbers that are significant to them. So if your birthdate happens to have a 7 in it, you can use it. That's *horrible* security since instead of discouraging people using poor passcodes, it encourages it.
Same deal with keeping the letters on the numberpads of bank ATMs. They know that many people use them to construct PINs. Why? A random series of numbers is secure. A set of numbers that spells a word (like someone's child's name for example) is not.
Lots of examples of interfaces designe for security, but with really poor designs out there. Hopefully, they'll get this one right despite the moron quoted in the article.