Biometric ATMsFollow

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051011/ap_on_bi_ge/biometric_atms;_ylt=Ak72hMZyB3AWsTmfjrZmYXSs0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTA3cjE0b2MwBHNlYwM3Mzg-

So, I saw this story about some South American banks using biometric ATMs and it got me wondering: how long before we hear about some thug being caught with a trunk full of body parts?

Two of the grocery stores I shop at have already rolled out their optional thumbprint scanners for customers to pay faster. I've found that I can pay plenty fast enough with my card.

I enjoy the added security of a PIN. Yes, it can be stolen/cracked/forced from me, but I actually prefer the odds of that versus a thief being forced to take a finger with him to clean out as much as an ATM will give him.

I think this is actually semi interesting. I know I loose my ATM/DEBIT cards occasionally. On the oposite end of the scale I know I don't misplace my thumb.

So you think big brother can't watch your every move when swiping your ATM card?

Puts a whole new meaning on giving someone the finger.

Father?

/waits for a hand upside the back of head.

Biometrics make for better security, though they shouldn't be the only means of protecting access to something.

All good security is multi-tiered. An ATM card requires two things before you can access your bank account - something you have (ATM card) and something you know (PIN number). Biometrics can replace the card by making the `something you have` a part of your own body.

Biometrics should not be the sole replacement for a two-step system. I currently work in a place that has iris scanners. The scanners are useless unless you first use your smartcard to access the device. The smartcard has no password, but this site has physical security out the wazoo, and part of their job is to make a postive ID (in person or via camera) on anyone using their smartcard for anything.

Rather than replace current functionality, they (banks) should add biometrics on as a third tier, so it's something you have (card), something you know (PIN), and something personal to you (thumbprint, iris, etc). Better security is yummy.

So what happens when the security is compromised somehow and your print gets "leaked"? You can change a pin number and a credit card number, but your finger stays put.

Although, I guess if your social security number gets picked up by someone it can't be changed, but they do have precautions out there to prevent it, such as changing ID numbers to other random numbers.

Absolutely true. I'm frankly astounded by one of the statements in the article that the goal is to get rid of the PIN "so there's nothing to steal". That's absurd. A biometric replaces the "something you have" part of the equation, but that should always be matched with "something you know". Otherwise, anyone who can defeat the biometric reader has full access to whatever it's supposed to be protecting.

The hardest thing to steal is the PIN. The easiest is anything that you carry with you, and that includes anything that would be physically scaned for (whether a card or a fingerprint).




I wouldn't go quite that far though. Remember that most customers are balancing security with convenience. Replacing a card you have to carry around with a fingerprint or eyescan adds convenience and costs the consumer nothing (same degree of security). Adding an extra layer (your three tiered solution) is great for things that really need more security, but would represent a convenience cost for the user. Not many people are going to want to bother with biometric scanners if they still have to carry the card around as well.

Remember that in the short term, not all ATMs will have biometric scanners even if the service is available. So you'll have some atms that will take a PIN and a scan, or a PIN and a card (like now). Having some that take a PIN, card, and scan doesn't actually protect the user at all since the thief will just go use an ATM that doen't require whatever he doesn't have Giving customers the option to lock their account to a higher security mode to prevent that means that they're limited in their choices of ATM until more use the full system. You'll take a hit businesswise trying to do that. Better to just roll new ATMs out that can take either a fingerprint or a card (in addition to a PIN), and gradually ease into the system over time without inconveniencing any of your customers alog the way.

Excellent point, gbaji, and one I had neglected.




I would think that if you're unable to use the fancy-pants biometric ATM that you could still walk into the bank branch and conduct your business in person, presenting appropriate identification to prove you are who you say you are. It may be that ATMs with advanced biometric scanners are not equally convenient to everyone, but by turns, drive-thru ATMs don't add convenience for people that don't own cars.




Actually, Katarine, companies have been working on that. I read an article recently that described ways to deal with that concern. Here's a similar article:

http://www.detnews.com/2005/technology/0508/27/tech-294670.htm



The article has some additional info on ancillary questions, such as what happens if the method of distortion gets compromised, etc - poor formatting, but not a bad read.

Exactly. It's no different then any other security system. One way hash's work great, the print is just used as one part of the hash.

That's really an irrelevant issue though. Someone can just as easily lift your fingerprint off a glass and make a slide that will fool the scanner.

The point is that the print replaces the card. Nothing more. All your ATM card has on it is your account number (it's got more, but that's all that's really needed). It's kind of like when you log into a system. The system must know *who* is logging in (account name/number), and then take some form of password/PIN in order to authenticate that you are the person the account is listed to. All the thumprint does is tell the ATM who's trying to log in. It should always be accompanied by a password of some kind for true security.



Exactly correct. However, at least according to one statement in the article, they're trying to eliminate that part of it. That's what I think is a horrible mistake. Anything you can carry with you physically can be stolen or replicated. Someone can make a copy of your print sufficient to identify you to the ATM pretty easily (and as pointed out, you can't change your fingerprint if that happens). The only way to make this secure is to also require a PIN (preferably an alphanumeric rather then the pure numerics they use right now).


There are lots of examples of manufacturers of products selling them as "secure" but designed in some cases specifically to be less secure. A fingerprint scanner without a PIN is one of those. Heh. One of the classic examples of poorly thought security is those cars with the "keyless entry" keypads. Ever looked at those things? They have 5 buttons. But the numbers on each button are paired (1/2, 3/4, 5/6, 7/8, 9/0 for example). Why do that? Clearly, there are realy only 5 buttons. By putting the numbers on them in that way, they encourage people to use numbers that are significant to them. So if your birthdate happens to have a 7 in it, you can use it. That's *horrible* security since instead of discouraging people using poor passcodes, it encourages it.

Same deal with keeping the letters on the numberpads of bank ATMs. They know that many people use them to construct PINs. Why? A random series of numbers is secure. A set of numbers that spells a word (like someone's child's name for example) is not.

Lots of examples of interfaces designe for security, but with really poor designs out there. Hopefully, they'll get this one right despite the moron quoted in the article.

That is an inherent danger using any POS (point of sale) system. Clearly, if I want my ATM/debit/credit card to be usable to make purchases, I want to make sure that only *I* can use it. That really requires a PIN of some kind (and preferably some form of ID). The problem is that you're really putting trust in the individual location to treat your ID/PIN combo securely. Most POS systems are relatively bulletproof (the store didn't build them, doesn't run them, and has no access to them, it just pays for a service). But you're still putting faith in the vendor to some degree.

In fact, you're putting faith in the individual vendor, the employees at that location, the business that runs the POS service, and the employees at that company (who you never know or see).


The real danger with POS systems is that you're only really protected to the degree the weakest POS system is protected. While *you* may choose to only do business at places where they check IDs diligently for instance, the guy who steals your card will undoubtably go to the most shady vendor, right?

That's why the focus has to be on ensuring the most security and requireing both authentication and authorization for every transaction.