Gbaji wrote:
Um. No. The problems I just outlined are the problems the 911 commission uncovered about our intelligence system. Different agencies not sharing information, and not being "on the same page" is what caused the information failures.
What you've described is a good thing. These are not problems. There is a reason we have the CIA, DIA, FBI, ATF, NSA, DOD, Secret Service, State Department etc, etc. It's another series of checks and balances within the executive branch. The structuring of agencies was set up with enough foresight to understand that too much power in the hands of too few people always,
always leads to bad things.
It's unfortunate that this structure is not fully constitutionally protected and provided for. So if the Bush administration wants to dismantle what other administrations have built upon for the last 80 years then they probably will. The 9/11 commission was for a good show, these guys intended to do it from the beginning.
As far as not being on the same page, you have to remember that different agencies are charged with handling different intelligence responsibilities both foreign and domestic. For example the CIA is responsible for foreign clandestine activities where as the FBI fills the role of domestic law enforcement. It should remain that way. This is not to say that agencies shouldn't share information when the need arises like in the case of foreign organizations planning domestic terrorism. More often than not, however, the FBI doesn't need to know what the CIA is doing and vice versa.
When these tasks are incorporated into a singular agency you first over estimate the efficiency of large bureaucracy. Secondly you undermine the ability of the other branches of government to provide oversight of nominees and appointments. For example the new Czar of intelligence will be much more directly influenced by the administration than a group of individual department heads would otherwise be. The sphere of influence is contracted and focused and congress has less opportunity to object to nominees simply because there are less people to nominate. That is a dangerous thing, without question.
Gbaji wrote:
Too much secrecy meant that important information often never reached those in the executive that had to make decisions, and certainly was never shared with other agencies so it could be validated and confirmed.
Inter-agency secrecy wasn't the largest problem with regards to 9/11. The intelligence required to stop 9/11 was for the most part already sitting on file at more than one agency. Additional information coming in that could have set off the proverbial warning siren wasn't being processed quickly enough. When the new leads finally did reach individuals who could have made recommendations, they weren't being taken seriously. Some people in the CIA and FBI knew where the threat was coming from, they just weren't being listened to.
It should have started on the ground floor of the FBI with a team of people looking at individual objects of intelligence instead of one guy deciding what to forward and what to toss out. That represents a problem with internal policy at the FBI and others. The most important change they could make is to start paying attention to threats even if they don't seem plausible or severe on the surface. After what happened on 9/11, this is being done.
I don't want to sound like I personally know how small items of intelligence are handled at these agencies. I'm basing my view on George Tenets testimony to congress and the words of several former FBI and CIA agents. Tenet himself tried to make a case for more inter-agency cooperation but couldn't deny the failure of his own bureaucracy. This was the opinion of the people actually doing the work.
People like this guy. Edit: Fixed link. Edited, Thu Dec 9 10:28:03 2004 by Jonthejon